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Verify Processor

Status Maintainers: @hilmarf, @jmacd, @MJarmo Source: opentelemetry-collector-contrib

Supported Telemetry

Logs

Overview

The verify processor verifies cryptographic integrity attributes that signingprocessor adds to log records. For each log record it rebuilds the same RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical JSON payload that signingprocessor signed (excluding all audit.integrity.* attributes), then checks the record attribute audit.integrity.value against the algorithm and key material described by the resource attributes audit.integrity.algorithm and (for asymmetric algorithms) audit.integrity.certificate. Supported algorithms match signingprocessor: RS256, RS512, ES256, EdDSA, and HMAC-SHA256. Failed records can be annotated in place, cause the whole batch to be rejected, or be dropped while good records are still exported. Permanent errors identify failed records by audit.record.id when present (id=<value>), otherwise by batch index (record[resource,scope,record]), with no other log content. Verification failures can be written to a dead-letter storage extension.

Configuration

For complete examples of all supported configurations see testdata/config.yaml. For invalid configuration examples used in tests see testdata/config_invalid.yaml.

Key source providers

Same provider set as signingprocessor, but every provider uses the shared YAML keys certificate or hmac_key (private-key fields are omitted). Each provider config must supply exactly one material — either a certificate or an HMAC secret, not both.
Note on the env key source: The certificate and hmac_key fields hold the actual PEM text or HMAC secret, not environment variable names. The collector’s confmap layer expands ${env:VAR_NAME} before the processor starts. See confmap environment variable substitution.

OpenBao key_source (API v2)

Same shape as signingprocessor: OpenBao api/v2 client and KV version 2. Equivalent logical read: mount secret + path verify → HTTP .../v1/secret/data/verify. Do not put secret/data/... in secret_path.

Integrity attributes (from signingprocessor)

Verification consumes the attributes that signingprocessor emits. Layout and semantics match that processor exactly.

Per log record

Per Resource (set once per ResourceLogs block)

Signed payload (must match signingprocessor)

Verification recomputes the same payload that signingprocessor signed. That processor serialises the following log-record fields into a JSON object, canonicalises it with RFC 8785 (JCS), and signs the result. All audit.integrity.* attributes are excluded so the signature can be verified without removing those attributes first. The verifier also excludes its own audit.verification.* output attributes, so a record can pass through several verify processors. If that check fails and the record already carries audit.verification.* attributes, the payload is rebuilt once with them included (regardless of audit.verification.profile). This covers pipelines that re-sign a record after an earlier verify step (sign → verify → sign → verify), where the second signer covered those attributes.

Attribute scalar encoding

Attribute values are encoded as follows to keep every scalar type distinct in the signed payload. Each scalar is wrapped in a type-tagged single-key object (e.g. {"intValue":"123"}) so that values of different types never produce identical canonical JSON. Serialization fails with a hard error if the total pre-JCS JSON size exceeds 2 MiB or the attribute nesting depth exceeds 128 levels.
Note on certificate expiry: The verifier does not reject expired certificates. Signatures made by an expired certificate still verify successfully, which is intentional for long-term audit log verification. Expiry enforcement, if needed, must be done outside this processor.

Output attributes

When failure_mode is mark or drop, verification results are stamped with the same attribute names at the highest uniform level:
  1. All records in a resource agree → stamp the resource only.
  2. Otherwise, when all records in a scope agree → stamp that scope only.
  3. Otherwise (mixed success/failure in a scope) → stamp each log record.
strict does not stamp (failed batches are not forwarded). Failure reason codes include: missing_integrity_value, missing_algorithm, unsupported_algorithm, missing_certificate, certificate_mismatch, key_material_mismatch, invalid_signature_encoding, integrity_mismatch, serialization_error. Record-level audit.verification.* attributes are excluded from the signed payload reconstruction (with a one-shot retry that includes them when present) so re-verification remains stable. Resource- and scope-level stamps are outside the signed log payload.

Example pipeline

In a real deployment, signingprocessor usually runs in a separate collector (sign at the source/sidecar, verify at the sink). Configure this processor with the public certificate or HMAC secret that matches the upstream signer.

Configuration

Example Configuration


Last generated: 2026-11-09