Verify Processor
Supported Telemetry
Overview
The verify processor verifies cryptographic integrity attributes thatsigningprocessor adds to log records.
For each log record it rebuilds the same RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical JSON payload
that signingprocessor signed (excluding all audit.integrity.* attributes),
then checks the record attribute audit.integrity.value against the algorithm
and key material described by the resource attributes
audit.integrity.algorithm and (for asymmetric algorithms)
audit.integrity.certificate. Supported algorithms match
signingprocessor: RS256, RS512, ES256, EdDSA, and HMAC-SHA256.
Failed records can be annotated in place, cause the whole batch to be rejected,
or be dropped while good records are still exported. Permanent errors identify
failed records by audit.record.id when present (id=<value>), otherwise by
batch index (record[resource,scope,record]), with no other log content.
Verification failures can be written to a dead-letter storage extension.
Configuration
For complete examples of all supported configurations see testdata/config.yaml. For invalid configuration examples used in tests see testdata/config_invalid.yaml.Key source providers
Same provider set assigningprocessor, but every
provider uses the shared YAML keys certificate or hmac_key (private-key
fields are omitted). Each provider config must supply exactly one material —
either a certificate or an HMAC secret, not both.
Note on theenvkey source: Thecertificateandhmac_keyfields hold the actual PEM text or HMAC secret, not environment variable names. The collector’s confmap layer expands${env:VAR_NAME}before the processor starts. See confmap environment variable substitution.
OpenBao key_source (API v2)
Same shape as signingprocessor: OpenBao api/v2 client
and KV version 2.
Equivalent logical read: mount
secret + path verify → HTTP
.../v1/secret/data/verify. Do not put secret/data/... in secret_path.
Integrity attributes (from signingprocessor)
Verification consumes the attributes that signingprocessor emits. Layout and
semantics match that processor exactly.
Per log record
Per Resource (set once per ResourceLogs block)
Signed payload (must match signingprocessor)
Verification recomputes the same payload that signingprocessor signed. That
processor serialises the following log-record fields into a JSON object,
canonicalises it with RFC 8785 (JCS), and signs the result. All
audit.integrity.* attributes are excluded so the signature can be verified
without removing those attributes first.
The verifier also excludes its own audit.verification.* output attributes,
so a record can pass through several verify processors. If that check fails
and the record already carries audit.verification.* attributes, the payload
is rebuilt once with them included (regardless of audit.verification.profile).
This covers pipelines that re-sign a record after an earlier verify step
(sign → verify → sign → verify), where the second signer covered those attributes.
Attribute scalar encoding
Attribute values are encoded as follows to keep every scalar type distinct in the signed payload. Each scalar is wrapped in a type-tagged single-key object (e.g.{"intValue":"123"}) so that values of different types never produce
identical canonical JSON.
Serialization fails with a hard error if the total pre-JCS JSON size exceeds
2 MiB or the attribute nesting depth exceeds 128 levels.
Note on certificate expiry: The verifier does not reject expired certificates. Signatures made by an expired certificate still verify successfully, which is intentional for long-term audit log verification. Expiry enforcement, if needed, must be done outside this processor.
Output attributes
Whenfailure_mode is mark or drop, verification results are stamped with
the same attribute names at the highest uniform level:
- All records in a resource agree → stamp the resource only.
- Otherwise, when all records in a scope agree → stamp that scope only.
- Otherwise (mixed success/failure in a scope) → stamp each log record.
strict does not stamp (failed batches are not forwarded).
Failure reason codes include:
missing_integrity_value, missing_algorithm,
unsupported_algorithm, missing_certificate, certificate_mismatch,
key_material_mismatch, invalid_signature_encoding, integrity_mismatch,
serialization_error.
Record-level audit.verification.* attributes are excluded from the signed
payload reconstruction (with a one-shot retry that includes them when present)
so re-verification remains stable. Resource- and scope-level stamps are outside
the signed log payload.
Example pipeline
signingprocessor usually runs in a separate collector
(sign at the source/sidecar, verify at the sink). Configure this processor with
the public certificate or HMAC secret that matches the upstream signer.
Configuration
Example Configuration
Last generated: 2026-11-09